Introduction
There are commonalities between, on the one hand, the notion of the responsibility ta proteet and, on the other, the notion of solidarity.
However, each notion has characteristÎcs which are not shared wÎth the other. The shared eharaeteristics and, more generally, the interplay between the two notions will be emphasised. The first part of this analysis will deal with the notion of solidarity, attempting ta give a working definition of what it means in the context of international law (1). The notion of "responsibility to proteet" as it has emerged in recent years will then be introduced (II). Having underlined the main elements of these definitions, we will swÎtch to an analysis of how they interact in the fields of human rights and international humanitarian law (III and IV) . The presentation will conclude with a discussion of international responsibility issues that are raised by the concepts of solidarity and the responsibility to protee!, and, in particular, the issue of international responsibility where there is inaction (V).
The Notion of Solidarity: A Tentative Definition
References to the notion of solidarity in international documents and instruments are still rather rare and mûst often the notion of solidarity is used without any accompanying definition. Therefore, in this con- "a fundamental value, by virtue of which global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes casts and burdens fairly, in aCCOfdance with basic principles of equity and social justice, and ensures that those who suffer or benefit the least receive help from those who benefit the most".'
The notion of solidarity is referred ta in international relations, but its contours are far from unambiguous and its legal status Îs unclear. The literature is no more generous in supplying a clear-cut definition and, in the absence of an unequivocal definition, the starting point for our reflection will be the above-mentioned definition found in sorne General Assembly resolutions. We will also refer ta a definition of solidarity which we find in the day-to-day use of this concept. A French dictionary speaks of a "relation between persons aware of the existence of a community of interests, entailing for sorne the moral obligation not to harm others and to assist them" (relation entre personnes ayant conscience d'une communauté d'intérêts, qui entraîne, pour les unes,
l'obligation morale de ne pas desservir les autres et de leur porter assistance).'
The core elements of the definition of solidarity that we will retain for the purpose of this contribution cao be sumrnarised in a Iew points: First, solidarity is a form of help given by sorne actors to other actors in order to assist the latter to achieve a goal or to recover frorn a critical situation. At the international level, one should stress that such Iorm of assistance does not necessarily have to be understood in the context of a State-to-State relationship but it can be understaod as the help provided by a State, or a group of States, ta the population of another State. Second, solidarity takes place within a shared value system at the level of a given communiey {in our case the international community).5 This can easily be supported by reference ta the above-mentioned General Assembly resolutions, as weIl as to the legal literature, where a certain number of authors -irrespeetive of their Qwn particular understanding of solidarity in international law -argue in terms of shared common "values" or "princip1es" among the members of the international community6 Third, solidarity entails a moral obligation in the sense that it is value-based, i.e. the moral obligation tO take into account the interests of others and to provide them with assistance. A moral obligation can be coupled with a legally binding obligation. It may or may not find expression in a specifie legal obligation. If not found in customary internationallaw, a dut y of solidarity can be negotiated between States through a treaty or even decided upon by an international organisation.
Fourth, this moral obligation is owed by sorne members of the international communîty rowards other members of the same community, and this will vary from one situation to another. This means that .in i said communiry in a specifie context, there are both providers and beneficiaries of solidarity. It is also ta be stressed that the provider of solidarity do es not aet with the purpose of drawing from its action a direct and conerete benefir.
Having introduced sorne aspects of the notion of solidarity that will be retained in the context of this contribution, it is imponant ro distÎn-guish the notion of solidarity from other notions, although they mighr share common features. First of ail, solidarity may be distinguished from cooperation. When linked by a cooperative relationship, twO Finally, solidarity should be distinguished from the UN collective security concept. Sorne authors consider that the UN collective security system is based upon the idea of solidarity' In my view, this would
• Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of scability and well-being which are ncccssary for peaeeful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determÎnation of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
mean that each time there is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression", action would be required on the basis of solidarity considerations. This argument is difficult to sustain, taking into account the fact that the UNSecurity Council has a discretionary power not only to qualify the situation, but also to decide if and how ta intervene in each case. JO Of course, this does not mean that solidarity arguments cannot be invoked 10 exercise sorne influence on the decisionmaking process for the Security Council to act in one way or another. We will come back ta this when reflecting on the concept of the responsibility ta protect.
At this stage, it should be emphasised that the notion of solidarity can be seenas an autonomous notion, and not just as a mere terminological variation of another concept. It is, however, not yet an autonomous legal notion. Our understanding is that solidarity also finds reflection as part of sorne existing legal concepts and norms. This appears ta be the case with the responsibility ta protect.
II. The Concept of "Responsibility to Protect" and the Framework of its Emergence
Belore examining the interplay between the notion of solidarity and the responsibility to protect, it is necessary to explain how the concept of responsibility to protect emerged and to underline its core elements. 
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The responsibility to proteet is a powerful instrument ta dissuade States from hiding behind the shield of their sovereignty to commit serious violations of the rights of the persons under their jurisdiction or ta allow these violations ta be committed. As a matter of fact, and of poli- order to protect the victims of these acts of violence, 'but also that they have the responsibility to do so. Thus the notion of responsibility to protect implies that it is each State's dut y to ensure respect for human rights to ail the individuals placed under its jurisdiction, whereas its possible failures set into action the right of the other States through the various means at thei ... disposai to act in order to protee! the victims.
The responsibility rests on each territorial State, but in the event of the said State's failure, the responsibility of the others cornes into play. VII, is there a possibility for States, willing to exereise their responsibility to proteet, ta aet through other channels or on other legal grounds? Would there be a right ta aet unde. customary internationaL law ta exercise the responsibility ta protect? Wauld there be a possibility ta act through regional organisations without an authorisation of the Security Couneil?"
III. Solidarity and Responsibility to Protect: J"wo Matching Notions
Before addressing the similarities between the notions of solidarity and the responsibility to proteet, we should reeall that the notion of soli darity cantains [WQ dimensions. In its "horizontal" dimension} solidarity is to be viewed as an international attitude aiming at reducing casualties or inequalities between States; chis is a State-to~State faTm of solidarity, hence horizontaL In ilS "vertical n dimension, solidarity is to be vicwed as a means of rescuing a population encountering serious dangers (hat eannot be proteeted by ilS own State. This is a form of solidarity where the relatiansrup is between States and populations of other States (and berween international organisations and populations), hence "vertical".
The "vertical" form of international solidarity dominates the analysis of the eommonalities between the notion of responsibility to protect and that of solid.rity. The firS! element of the definition eoneerns the direction of solidarity: it goes from sorne actoTS to other ones or better from
States endowed with the necessary means ra organise a humanitarian assistance/rescue operation to States or populations encountering grave difficulties. This is preeisely the essence of the responsibility to protect, whcn a group of States uses the means at irs disposaI under intcrnationallaw -whethcr of financial, technicaJ, military or othec narure 25 -24 See the various înterpretations given lO to help and secure a population that is suffering grave human rights violations. The second e!ement of the definition points out that solidarity is based on shared values at the leve! of the international community. This is aiso true for the concept of responsibility to protect, which rests on the worldwide condernnation of genocide, war crimes, ethnie cleansing and crimes against humanity.26 The widely shared sentiment of the importance of adopting appropriate rneasures in order to prevent the commission of sueh crimes finds a refleetion in the notion of responsibility to protect. The third element concerns the moral facet of solidarity. Just as it is the case with solidarity, the responsibility to protect is charaeterised by a strong moral aspect, by virtue of the central role this notion gives to the well-being of eivilian populations suffering from grave violations of human rights. The legal profile of the notion of responsibility to protect is progressively consolidated in law. 27 Ir may be too early to talk about a positive legal obligation to aet in order to proteet populations suffering grave violations of human rights, when the competent governmental authorities are unable or unwilling to do so, but, the strong moral contour of the notion of responsibility to proteet may have sorne influence on the decision-making proeess leading to the adoption of collective security measures decided upon by the Security Council. Finally, it should be added that, as in the case of solidarity measures, there is no expeeted direct and eonerete benefit for those intervening in order to help an endangered population in the name of the responsibility to proteet.
This reasoning shows that the definition of solidarity matches the notion of responsibility to proteet, which is thus to be eonsidered as one of the forms that international solidarity can take. The link between solidarity and responsibility to protect stems directly from one of the key elements of the notion of responsibility to proteet: not only State insecurity, but also human insecurity is to be viewed as a situation justifying international enforcement actions undertaken by the UN Seeurity Couneil.
In solidarity terms, it can be said that an international solidarity action takes place when a State or a group of States intervenes in the context of grave human insecurity in a certain region of the world. In other words, the whole construction of the notion of responsibility to protee! can be seen as an institutionalised (through the UN), and also moral and legal expression of solidarity.
IV. Solidarity, Responsibility to Protect and International Humanitarian Law
The responsibility to proteet finds specifie legal support in international humanitarian law through the obligation to respect and ensure respect for humanitarian law as enshrined in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. This duty is one of the legal manifestations of the responsibility to proteet, as weil as of solidarity, even though the responsibility to protee! has a broader scope of application. In contradistinction to the obligation to respect humanitarian law and ensure that humanitarian law be respeeted, the responsibility to proteet may apply even where no conflict, be it international or internai, is in existence.
Cornmon article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions is particularly pertinent in this respect. It reads as follows: "[tlhe High Contraeting Parties agree to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in ail eircumstanees". This provision was reiterated in article 1(4) of the 1977 First Additional Protoeol. As sueh, the obligation to respect and ensure respect applies to international conflicts and indeed, to noninternational eonfliets te the extent that the latter are also covered by cornmon article 3.
The obligation te respect and to ensure respect for humanitarian law is a double-sided obligation, as it calls on States both to respect and to ensure respect. To respect means that the State is under an obligation to do everything it can te ensure that the rules in question are respected by its organs as well as by all persons under its jurisdiction. To ensure respect means that States, whether parties to a conflict or not, must take aIl pos-sible measures [Q ensure lhal lhe rules are respeeled by ail, and in partieular by lhe parties to a confliet."
Over lhe laS! half-century, the practice of States and international organisations, bUltressed by jurisprudential findings" and doctrinal opinions, c1early suppOrtS the interpretation of cornrnon article 1 as a mIe that compels aH States, whether or not parties to a conflict, not only to take part actively in ensuring cornplîance with rules of international humanitarian law by aU of the concerned enrities, but also to reacr against its violations. Further, common article 1 speaks of an obligation to respect and to ensure respect C'in aH circumstances", making the obligation unconditional and, in particular, not subjecr to the constraint of reciprocity. Nowadays it is widely admilled that the obligation contained in common article 1 is binding on aU States and competent international organisations.
JO
. . In its Advisory Opinion, the Court has shed light on ail the implications of the obligation which is binding on the parties ta a conf\icr in the field of international humanitarian law, the whole international community and all the States." The substance of the obligation is not only ta acknowledge wrongful situations, but also for each entity to take measures in order to make these violations StOp, using al! available and legally acceprable means for thar purpose. They include diplomatie and economic measures as weil as legal means 5uch as those provided for b.y rhe rules of international responsibility. In partieular, as recalled by the Court:
In its 2004 Advisory
"Given the eharacrer and the importance of the rights and obliga- In other words, can we read the issues of solidarity and responsibility ta protect through the lenses of international responsibility, by holding 
Tt is important ta stress that a qualification under Article 39 of the UN
Charter launches what Article 24 of the Charter calls the Securiry Council's "primary responsibility": the Council must then carry out its "duties" to mainrain or restore peace by bringing to an end whatever it is that endangers the peace. The principles are set down and even wellestablisbed. The means of implementation should therefore work effec- Threats, Challenges and Change reeommended to the permanent members of the Seeurity Couneil that they «refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genoeide and large-scale human rights abuses".37 In this situation, should the responsibility te proteet be a dut y, the international organisation's responsibility for a breaeh of its responsibility to proteet would come with the question of the international responsibility borne by the States preventing the action of the organisation: by acting in such a way, the States wou Id have breached their duty on the basis of the responsibility to proteet and of solidarity. One should also refer to the responsibility of eaeh State and eaeh com- 
Concluding Remarks
Solidarity and the responsibility to proteet are interrwined. From a legal point of view the responsibility to proteet gives legal expression ta the notion of solidarity in the sense that ie specifies the condirions of action for proteeting shared values which are of a human rights nature. The responsiblJity to proteet stresses the responsibility to prO\fide assistance to affected populations. This should be understood as a manifestation of solidarity of the international eommunity towards human beings whose rights are impaired. The responsibility to proteet also aets as a 
Discussion Following the Presentation by Laurence Boisson de Chazournes
C. Tomuschat: First of ail 1 want to thank Laurence for a beautiful presentation, which indeed, as she said, demonstrated the interlinkage between solidarity and the responsibilicy co proteCt. 1 have maybe three points, sorne of them go co the heart of the coneeptualising effort, and others may be more marginal. 1 heard several times that the responsibility to proteet was understood as a duty, an obligation to respect and to proteet whilst on the other hand in the General Assembly resolution, the drafters quite deliberately chose the word "responsibility". Now, is the responsibility a dut y or an obligation? Is it something less? 1 think the drafters deliberately lowered the terminologieal rellection of the concept they had in mind to leave it in sorne kind of limbo, in a stage between a moral and a legal obligation. 50, 1 think that responsibility is indeed something less. It is not a sharply cut ducy. It is something else. My second observation also relates to the responsibilicy to protect. Isn't that aecording to the World 5ummit Outcome much less than what already exists under the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and ail other international human rights bodies? According to the understanding of ail of those bodies, human rights include positive obligations. States parties do not only have to abstain from imerfering, but they are obligated to protect the rights actively. Accordingly, the right to life must not only be shielded from genocide and war crimes, but must be protected -like all other rights -in a comprehensive manner. 50 aren't we falling back? Isn't that just a decisive step back from what we have already achieved through the jurisprudence not only that of the Human Rights Committee but all other constitutional courts except from the US Supreme Court, which has not em braced the doctrine of protection? Ali the human rights bodies assert rhe existence of positive obligations. By contrast, the World 5ummit Outcome just mentions genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Thar is much less.
And now my third point: You said that as far as solidarity is concerned, benefits accrue only to one party and not to both parties. So for you it is a one-sided and not a bilateral relationship. 1 really doubt that. Solidarity involves long-term and short-terru aspects. Of course, in the short run, you do not derive any benefits if you give a loan of 10 million or even 10 billion dollars to one specifie country. But in the long run, the lender does it in order to derive sorne benefits from that kind of operation. The transaction cannot be described as pure altruisrn. The lender expects sornething, but not irnmediately. 50 there is no irnmediate consideration but in a long-term perspective, even development assistance is based on reciprocity. Look at Afghanistan, what are we doing? We are sending troops ta Afghanistan. Ir is not just on account of altruism because we find that the Afghans are such nice people. We want to protect ourselves against international terrorism. That is the bilateral relationship, the reciprocity. 50 if we look at it more accurately, we find that there is always sorne consideration but it is a question of time -long-term versus short-terrn. tervene (which is not accompanied by any obligation to this effect) has not been utilised, as evidenced by the lack of action in instances such as Dadur and Zimbabwe. However, it remains possible in theory that in future the African Union -without any explicit authorisation by the Security Council in accordance with Article 53(1) of the United Nations Charter -will rely on article 4(h) in order to imervene militarily in a Member State of the African Union. Trus brings me to my question, namely whether we May be observing the emergence of more concrete obligations pertaining to the "responsibility to protect" on the regional leve!? Also, would this "regionalisation" of the responsibiliry to protect (and which may possibly result in violation of the United Nations Charter) be a response to the inability of the United Nations to concretise these obligations on the more universal level?
E. de Wet

H. Neuhold:
This was an impressive presentation. However, 1 have twO difficulties with your definition. Firstly, you emphasised that solidarity is a re!ationship between stronger and weaker actors. But think of the ex ample 1 gave this morning. Would you not agree that the readiness of the less powerful NATO membeTS to assiS! the United States after "9/11" was a manifestation of transadantic solidarity? 11oreover, Christian Tomuschat pointed to another problem. In my opinion, solidariry does not exclude advantages for the benefactor. An example that cornes tO my mind is the Marshall Plan wruch was not only in the imerests of the European States that received American aid but also in those of the United States that wamed to prevent the extension of the Soviet sphere of influence by communist takeovers and to deve!op attractive economic partners in Western Europe.
My second remark concerns the responsibiliry to protect. What 1 would like to underline is that we are witnessing the change of a fundamental paradigm, that of State sovereignty. The new concept implies a shift from the rights and privileges of the almighty State whose subjects are supposed to serve to aState which, in tuen, has ro ;ustify the existence by providing for the security and well-being of irs citizens. It is also worth mentioning that rrus principle has been accepted, ar least in general terms, at the higheS! political leve! by the World Summit and the meeting of the UN General Assembly at the leve! of heads of State or govemment in September 2005. The right of the international community to act if aState is unable or unwilling to live up to ilS responsibility to proteet, opens anorher door ro pracrice international" so1idarity and to give it more leg.1 substance. Whether 50lidarity m.y eventu.lIy become a Baugesetz, a fundamental principle of the international legal order, is a question which on1y radical optimists would answer in the affirmative at the present rime. L. Boisson de Chazournes: [thank you ail for your questions and comments. My instinct while writing included trying te push sorne of the limits of the notion of the responsibility to proteet sa as te better understand its rationale and to try to sec if it fits with the 'notion of solidarity. [ do not have a fixed view about the precise legal status of the notion of the responsibility to proteet. [ndeed, [ do not think that vesting the prineiple with a more eompulsory status adds much in practical terms in the field of human rights, because we can rely on the body of human rights law and Christian Tomuschat has mentioned the work of the human rights committee in this respect. We should also refer te the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights whieh provide clear indications of the notion of collective responsibility which contributes ta the understanding of the notion of the responsibility te protect. And, further, we ean refer to the [Crs 2004 advisory opinion with respect ta the dut y to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, as weIl as human rights, where they found application. Those elements give sorne sort of legal corpus te the notion of the responsibility to proteet. This being said, 1 do not think that the responsibility ta proteet as sueh brings new legal perspectives, but 1 think that it funetions as a catalyser. Ir has helped us to think in unitary terms about what we should do in a collective manner in order to react to grave violations of humap. rights.
The notion of the responsibiliry te proteet has helped us te think in terms of the collectivisation of the responsibility to react to grave violations of human rights. Is this notion of collectivisation of the responsibility not an expression of solidariry? Now, with respect to the definition of solidarity, 1 attempted ta look at it as an autonomous concept and to distinguish it from other notions.
When 1 referred te short-term benefits, 1 had in mind lucrative benefits.
Maybe there are sorne benefits in the long-term, such as, for example, the pacification of a country or a region. Yet, the long-term is quite far away and we have to think and to act with a short-term perspective. Now, with respect to Afghanistan, with ail due respect te Christian, [ means have not produced effeets. As to a regional approach in terms of the interpretation of the responsibility to proteet, the case of the African Union treaty is, so far, unique. Article 4 of the AfrÎcan Union Charter is not cleac. There might be room for regional reactions to violations of human rights. My interpretation of the Afriean Union trcaty is that the African States were not willing to detach themselves from the UnÎted Nations Charter, but the idea was that in the event of inaction from the United Nations, they want to be in a position to (Caet and to do something. S.Oeter: Laurence, 1 think your elegant and enlightening talk has highlighted in rny mind a very strong dilemma which is inherent in the principle of solidarity -and in the way of operationalising it in the sense of the concept of the "responsibility to proteet". 1 think yOuf contribution has highlighted why so many States voiee strong reservations tawards the concept of the responsibility to protect. 1 think if you reconstruct the principlc of solidarity in such a way -1 would cali it a progressive way, and by progressive 1 mean in the sense how Tullio Treves has highlighted it this morning because you replace States as the beneficiaries of solidarity, whieh at the beginning of the process in the 70s they thought ta be, by peoples -it rneans at the end turning the principle of solidarity against States. 1 think there is a logic in doing just this if you look at the problern from a perspective of political philosophy -and 1 have a strong syrnpathy tow.rds looking at the problem from su ch an angle. But at the end, such reconstruction leads inta a very strong dilemma, because Ït means alienating States from that normative developrnent, driving thern inta a kind of revoit because they lee! ta be a potential victim 01 that kind of reconstruction. At the end we have the problem of how to construct a normative consensus on such an opera-tionalisation of solidarity in a community like the United Nations, whieh is a community of States and not a community of peoples.
K. Wellens:
\Vith regard ID your last remark, if 1 may, this morning 1 was thinking about the following when Tullio Treves made his intervention, and now you are saying: maybe that is a way of turning solidarity against States. One example, in my view, wou Id be the phenomenon of targeted sanctions. The use of targeted sanctions is a qualified form of solidarity beeause in doing so, the Security Couneil is at least in the position to spare the population. Now, Laurence, thank you for clarifying the relationship between the responsibility to proteet and solidarity. \Vith regard to the question whether or not there is a moral or a legal obligation, you said at one point that, unless 1 mÎsunderstood you, there is no legal obligation at the cusIDmary law level. And if 1 may refer to what came up this morning in the discussion about the Bosnian case: the faet that the Court did not want ta go inID an exploration of whether or not there is a general dut y to prevent violations of internationallaw is, in my view, at least leaving the door open to that possibiIity. Not a question, but a remark: You mentioned the relation between humanitarian assistance and the responsibility to proteet: whether or not humanitarian assistance does fit in squarely with the responsibility ta protect is still a matter of debate. J n my written paper 1 made a reference ID Eduardo's preliminary report, where he said that the relation between the responsibility to proteet and humanitarian assistance needs careful consideration. 50 he has been very eautious about it. Several participants, starting with Professor Tomuschat, have raised the question about the responsibility ta protect and the duty. Beeause you made reference ID the State responsibility regime, the only thing 1 want to mention here is that during the discussion at the Société Française on the topic, Giorgio Gaja drew the distinction between the responsibility sensu lato, the responsibility ta protect and the responsibility sensu stricto where you have a possibility of internationallegal responsibility. And 1 think the normative contribution of the responsibility to protect lies mainly not in introducing the principle of solidarity and giving it a legal status but with regard ta the obligation ta prevent. Thank you.
M. Wood:
There has not been very mu ch from the Anglo·American V. Roben: 1 wonder whether this is not another example of the lawmaking process in the UN, where you first essentiaHl' have ta have the formulation of an idea that encapsulates a certain basic conviction of the organisation's Member States, which then needs to be put into practice or concrctised in a cascading law-making process, and l think we have a couple of examples of exactly that kind of law-making proces" prominenrly in the law of the sea and the protection of the environment.
Y. Chen:
1 would like ta just make a comment from a linguistic perspective. Today 1 listened ta three very excellent presentations on the solidarity principle and the responsibility ta protect. However impres- thing we use to understand and prescribe the world. By language, we ereare connections between the outside world and us, and also prescribe the relations between human beings. Reality and subjcctivity, fact and value, are intertwined in the making and shaping of language. By reconstituting words and inventing new concepts, we are reconstituting the world. We are reconstructing the way of our thinking. We are trying to find new ways to approach the world and try ta meet the new challenges and new needs of our society. For this purpose, from time to time, we make new interpretations to sorne old concepts and we also invent new phrases; whether these efforts succeed or not, it could indicate a kind of change of our paradigm to the world. In this sense, 1 would like to make further a brief observation on two new concepts, that of solidarity and that of the responsibility ta protect. These two concepts are prominently characterised by combining the State dimension and the individual dimension together. We are introducing our moral responsibility to the legal dimension. A pure interstate approach in our legal thinking is consciously or unconsciously deemed insufficient to resolve the problems we are facing today. In my opinion, we should reflect these two concepts in an even grander process of internationallaw: 1 mean the humanisation process of internationallaw. These new concepts, in light of shaping our legal thinking and imagination, may contribute to the establishment of an international law to ensure the very survival of mankind advocated by Professor Tomuschat in his Hague course. Thank you.
A. G. Koroma: 1 would like to thank Professor Boisson de Chazournes for clarifying sorne issues and indicating how the principle of solidarity could work or be implemented. 1 would have stopped at an earlier point for sorne of the interesting questions, and 1 would possibly have invited her in her last response to respond to the allegation that the prineiple of solidarity is subversive to the nation State. 1 do not think of the allegation in such concrete terrns but, according to rny understanding, it could be potentially subversive to the nation State. Maybe you would want to dwell on that or throw sorne light on that question. Another issue 1 would like to raise: 1 do not think we should dwell so much on the term of the" responsibility to proteet". We all know how the United Nations operates and therefore we should look at the expression in its context. Why did Canada introduce such an item for example? Canada has been one of the leading peaee-keeping nations of the world and so we should understand that Canada has an interest in these matters and is a dedieated member of the United Nations. Let me take the Genocide Convention as an example. If the Security Council is going to determine that genoeide has taken place, then of course the Security Couneil has to act. So if you talk about the dut y to protect, it obviously entails certain consequences and it is not for me entirely surprising that the United Nations should have resorted to what one would call an anodyne term when talking about the responsibility to proteet. When we talk about the responsibility ta proteet, apart from action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 1 do not think we should immediately think of military measures. Maybe Canada might not be in a position to send troops to a place where genocide has occurred but she could provide resourees. The responsibility ta proteet entails many di- there is a responsibility or dury on the part of African States to react. In the case of ECOWAS, Nigeria took the initiative. And now the African Union has taken upon itself to react in certain circurnstances. But of course the action ECOWAS took in Liberia and Sierra Leone was later validated by the Security Council. Again, l think this provision in the means more than just words looked at separately in an isolated manner.
We should also have in mind the context of the adoption of this resolution: i.e. the reform proeess wbieh was launehed by the Seeretary Generai Kofi Annan beeause of the 2003 Iraq confliet and some States' eritieisms of the UN framework. The unilateralism was opposed to the UN collective system. The decision was taken by the Secretary General, l think quite bravely, to address the functioning of the collective security system and the tools and means at the disposai of the international community when there are serious breaches of international law. The ICISS report, the UN High-level Panel report and then the ensuing report of the Secretary-General and the World Summit Outcome are ail bearers of the concept of collective action. There was a strong sense of rebutting unilateral armed action.
On another point, there should be great care not to narrow down the responsibility to protect solely to the resorr to force. The notion of the responsibility to proteet refers to each State. First and foremost, each State has a primary responsibility. The responsibility of others cornes into play for violations of human rights and humanitarian law which are considered at the universallevel as grave and massive when there is a lack of action from the responsible State. The Security Couneil is central for authorising resort to force should there be such a need. The General Assembly also has a role to play. It has even given itself the task of developing the understanding of the notion of the responsibility to proteet. It has a mandate to do so. Thank you.
